

eFORT Incident Response and Resilience Actions

29-08-2023



Establishment of a FramewORk for Transforming current EPES into a more resilient, reliable and secure system all over its value chain

ARES Conference – EPESec Workshop

Swarna Kumarswamy-Das, TNO The Netherlands










- 1. Introduction eFORT
- 2. Incident response
- 3. Resilience actions








Introduction - eFORT

Coordinator: CIRCE (ES)





4 Demonstrators:







4 Innovation Pillars

Set of solutions

1

ENHANCED TOOLS FOR ANALYSING EPES' RISKS AND THREATS

MEASURES AND CHNOLOGIES TO RENGTHEN EPES

- MORE SECURE AND PRIVATE GRID DATA MANAGEMENT
- OPERATIONAL
 TECHNOLOGIES AND
 STRATEGIES FOR
 UPGRADING GRID
 RESILIENCY

Intelligent Platform (software)

- Vulnerabilities database
- Interactive visualization tool
- Dynamic risk assessment tools (cyber and physical)
- · Self-healing algorithm

Asset management

- . Cascading effects and inter-area oscillations impact on TSO stability
- · Secure TSO-DSO data sharing procedures
- · IoT security advances
- · Real-time islanding operation and decision support for grid restoration
- Digital Substations (process bus, RTU, BIM, advanced LAN)
- Securebox (IDS/IPS execution, secure DER operation, tamper proof, encryption techniques)
- · Control Room of Future (training, CSIRT)

Digital technologies

- Intrusion detection and prevision systems Security Information and event management
- Digital twins of the whole interconnected power grid
- · Blockchain for grid resiliency and verification
- AI-based control algorithms
- Edge computing and IoT

4 Demonstrators



TSO level: Cascading effects and restoration of interconnected power grids



DSO level: Flexibility and islanding on mountainous and remote areas



Substation: Digitalisation and secure design of a substation



DSO-micro grid: IoT, blockchain and cybersecurity in a prosumer-grid



- Techno-Economic analysis
- · Replication potential evaluation
- Assessment of business models
- Recommendations for standards and regulations
- Exploitation of synergies with BRIDGE initiatives

↑ Reliability, ↑ Resiliency, ↑ Security

VS.

Failures, Cyberattacks, Physical disturbances,
Data privacy issues





Demonstration 2 – The Netherlands

Preventing cascading failures and restoring interconnected power grids





Key partners

Lead: TenneT

TNO


European Network for Cyber Security

DNV

Delft University of Technology

CIRCE

- Digital Twin of Power grid & cyber range for IT/OT equipment & network
- Control Room station
- Security Operation Centre





Dutch sub-consortium in eFORT





Blue Team IT/OT Security Operation Centre Infrastructure



Incident Response Team

SOC Analyst





CoA **Platform**

CTI Platform

Security Orchestration & Integration

SIEM

Infra. Model


Vuln. Scanner Response tools













TUD digital twin design












MU: Merging Unit - PMU: Phasor Measurement Unit - CPC: Centralized Protection and Control - PDC: Phasor Data Concentrator





UC1. Responding to

Use cases




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Use cases

UC2. Responding to new vulnerability in OT systems










eFORT – TNO focus (as is)



TSO

scope of the information security management system (e.g. ISO/IEC 27001)







management



SAFET FIRST

scope of operations

(safety & continuity in supply)



transmission lines



substation \ infrastructure

substations




substation infrastructure

TSO grid operations



central operations infrastructure










eFORT – TNO focus (to be)







Demonstrator in NL

Control Room of the Future (CRoF)





digital twin design



TUDelft

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Blue Team



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SOC Analyst



Threat Analysis

CoA **Platform**

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
Infra. Model

Vuln. Scanner Response tools










TUD digital twin design





DNV




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
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SOC / CSIRT for EPES

IT/OT Security Operation Centre Infrastructure





SOC Analyst



- SPE4 COMP 3 Patch management
- SPE 7 Event and incident management

FIRST Services Framework

Service Areas

- (Information) Security Event Management
- (Information) Security Incident Management
- Vulnerability Management

11 Strategies of a World-Class SOC


Functional Categories

- Incident Triage, Analysis, and Response
- Cyber Threat Intelligence, Hunting, and Analytics
- Vulnerability Management (if performed by the SOC)
- Expanded SOC Operations
- SOC Tools, Architecture, and Engineering
- Situational Awareness, Communications, and Training
- Leadership and Management



SOC / CSIRT for EPES

IT/OT Security Operation Centre Infrastructure







SOC Analyst

Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response

- Processes (workflows / roles & responsibilities
- / checklists)
- Response Actions (e.g. containment, temporary mitigate vuln.)










Infrastructure to protect


Support Incident Response with Automation FORT







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EPES Resilience / cyber resilience

the resilience of the EPES (*main goal*:

- anticipate
- absorb
- recover
- <u>adapt</u>

from shocks)




Figure 1. Cyber Resiliency Engineering Framework

NIST SP 800-160 Volume 2 (rev 1) Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach





Operational cyber resilience actions






operational cyber resilience actions

triggered by new threat / vulnerability






operational cyber resilience actions triggered by detected attack

withstand/absorb & recover

post incident operational cyber resilience actions

time


adapt



anticipate & adapt



Operational cyber resilience actions – new vulnerability





Vulnerability Management

Exploitation of vulnerability (if and from when this happens differs per vuln.)

Vulnerability discovered

Vulnerability reported







Software patch available



Testing of software patch on own systems



Software patch installed on own systems



time

EPES operator action:

assess vulnerability within own infrastructure & apply temporary measures



Summary

Main objective of the eFORT Project is...

... to make European power grids more resilient and reliable to failures, cyberattacks, physical disturbances and data privacy issues.

How?

To this end, a set of **technological innovations** will be developed for the **detection**, **prevention** and **mitigation** of risks and vulnerabilities with positive impacts on power system operation and stability.


The eFORT solutions will be demonstrated at **TSO**, **DSO**, **substation** and **consumer levels** in **4 real demonstration grids** that have been selected considering their complementarities and relevance to tackle the main threats of current European power systems.





References

- Cyber Security Control Frameworks (ISO/IEC 27000, IEC 62443 part 2-1, NIST SP 800-82r3)
 - In cyber security it is common to map to NIST framework: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover
 - Cyber Resilience Engineering NIST SP 800-160, VOLUME 2
- NIST SP 800-160 Volume 2 (rev 1) Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach
- System life cycle => controls assigned to Security Operations Center
- eFORT https://efort-project.eu/about/





Thank you!

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